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9Imagining the Internet: 
Open, closed or in between?
Robin Mansell1
The policies and practices aimed at facilitating inclusive 
information societies in the Latin American and Caribbean 
region, as in all regions of the world, are underpinned by the 
assumptions people make about how change happens. In the 
present era nearly all stakeholders are aware of changes in society 
that are accompanying rapid innovation and investment in digital 
information and communication technologies. This awareness 
may stem from their active use of digital applications and services 
or it may be the result of their exclusion from closed networks 
and services or even from those that are open for reasons of 
lack of access, financial resources or skills. Many cultural, social, 
political and economic factors influence the particular ways in 
which stakeholders envisage how change in information societies 
happens, how best to shape these changes towards desirable 
goals, and the consequences of different pathways in particular 
locales, countries and regions. These visions and assumptions 
about the future of information societies are underpinned by 
deeply embedded imaginaries which inform the decisions of all 
the stakeholders involved in these changes. 
1 Robin Mansell is Chair of the Scientific Committee of the annual European 
Communications Policy Research Conference; a member of the Promotions Board 
at Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Sussex, where she was a trustee, 1999-
2009. She is a member of Scientific Advisory Council, LIRNEAsia, Sri Lanka. She was 
President of the International Association for Media and Communication Research 
(IAMCR), 2004-2008 and remains and active member of IAMCR’s Scholarly Review 
Committee and Finance Committee.
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Social imaginaries can be understood as the way people 
imagine their social existence or as the Canadian philosopher, 
Charles Taylor put it, “how they fit together with others, how 
things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations 
which are normally met, and the deeper normative notions 
and images which underlie these expectations”.2 How do 
today’s social imaginaries inform the way stakeholders think 
about the present and future of information societies and the 
consequences for development? Very simply, there are two 
prevailing social imaginaries about digital technologies, the 
Internet, mobile phones and their applications, both of which 
involve a deep commitment to the idea that these technologies 
provide opportunities for building ‘good’ or just and equitable 
societies. The prevailing dominant imaginary in today’s 
information societies is market-led. In contrast, alternative 
imaginaries are best described as ‘open’ or commons-led. 
Progress towards the realization of one of these imaginaries is 
typically seen as being damaging to the realization of the other. 
It is this conflict that leads to major problems for stakeholders 
in deciding which policies and strategies, or mix of policies and 
strategies, is most likely to facilitate progress towards more just 
and equitable information societies.
The dominant imaginary is one of a universal ‘information 
society’ in which digital technologies and their applications are 
directly associated with ‘digital enlightenment’ or knowledge 
which can be applied with relatively little investment, apart 
from that required to achieve connectivity and access to digital 
information. It assumes that competition among technology and 
service suppliers is the best way to achieve widespread access 
to information (and knowledge) and that state security is a very 
high priority even if this involves surveillance, privacy intrusions 
and secrecy.  Commercial expansion is assumed to be the optimal 
pathway towards inclusive participation in the information 
society, achieved through the increasing personalization of 
2  Taylor, Charles. 2007. A Secular Age. Cambridge MA: Belknap Press.
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digital services and the extension and enforcement of existing 
copyright legislation to create incentives for the production and 
consumption of digital products and services. 
The ‘open’ or commons-led alternative imaginaries are 
characterized by some form of ‘digital resistance’ to the universal 
model of the information society. This usually involves some 
from of countervailing power, a privileging of co-operation 
and collaboration over competition, and innovative forms of 
networked collaboration often by dispersed communities. These 
imaginaries assume that trusting relationships can be fostered in 
information societies by maximizing information and decision 
making transparency through open access to information 
and by encouraging information sharing, encouraged by new 
approaches to information ownership. 
The dominant imaginary of the information society gives 
a priority to technological innovation, often focusing on the 
benefits of technological convergence and opportunities 
created by the increasing modularity, miniaturization, and 
interoperability of digital services based on multiple platforms 
and intense market competition. In this imaginary, the principle 
focus, for example, is often on the diffusion of mobile phones 
or smart phones and on connectivity and access to information. 
Policy often focuses principally on the spread of access 
to broadband networks and on the growth of commercial 
markets for digital content creation and aggregation. Debates 
tend to be concentrated on the rate of investment in network 
infrastructures and the implications of leadership in this area 
for the development of web browsing, peer-2-peer, Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP), apps and user contributed video, 
but in terms of Internet traffic growth and revenues. The 
public policy debate focuses much less on developments in the 
‘private’ or closed Internet for the managed digital services 
which increasingly supports digital television, Internet Protocol 
television (IPTV)  and Internet Protocol telephony, nearly all 
of which are led by the commercial market strategies of private 
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companies. These developments have major implications for 
the way citizens will experience their information societies in 
the future and whether they are able to access digital services 
that are open and available for collaborative sharing or closed 
and restricted to those who are able to participate in the market. 
This has implications for whether future digital environments 
are consistent with the values of freedom of expression and 
inclusive citizen participation which are aligned with the 
alternative imaginaries of information societies.
In the dominant imaginary of the information society, 
information is deemed to have economic value and the policy 
priority is to ensure that intellectual property rights legislation 
is designed and enforced to enable the exploitation of this value. 
In contrast, in the alternative imaginaries, digital information 
is assumed to ‘want to be free’. There are differences among 
stakeholders who align with this view, but the main priority 
for policy is to maximize opportunities for open access to 
information. Conflicts arise between those seeking to enforce 
copyright protections and social movements that seek to set 
information ‘free’, for example, through copyright infringing 
file sharing of music and other digital content or through 
collaborative online contributions that are open for use and 
reuse by all. 
In the dominant social imaginary of the information 
society with its emphasis on technological innovation, a key 
priority is to promote the increasing sophistication of the 
automated collection and processing of digital information. 
Automation is giving rise to new potentials for the surveillance 
of all online activities by both the State and the private sector. 
Increasingly, citizens can ‘click’ but they cannot ‘hide’. In 
alternative imaginaries, these developments are seen as having 
substantial implications for human rights and for whether or 
not future information societies are consistent with the values 
of transparency and democratic participation in society. 
Proponents of alternative imaginaries of information 
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societies are well-aware that digital platforms can be used 
for malicious attacks against both individuals and the State. 
In some cases, States are using digital network capabilities to 
respond with force and companies are using these automated 
surveillance capabilities to develop sophisticated targeted 
advertising and marketing techniques. These automation 
techniques for information processing are also giving rise to 
major new initiatives to take advantage of vast repositories of 
digital information or ‘big data’ for an increasing variety of 
mapping and visualization applications, many with beneficial 
development implications in fields such as health and the 
environment. However, here too there are contests between the 
dominant and alternative imaginaries of information societies. 
In the former, ‘big data’ may be closed and exclusive to its 
owners; in the latter, such data are seen as a public resource that 
can be mined and applied when it is managed in an open way. 
The dominant and alternative imaginaries of information 
societies are deeply contested. The specific form of contestation 
is expressed in different ways in various regions of the world 
depending on their histories, cultural contexts, social, economic 
and political characteristics, and institutional environments. 
In the case of each of the key issue areas discussed so far, the 
central question that needs to be asked is who is benefiting from 
information societies now and who will benefit in the future? 
Are those benefits fairly and equitably distributed? If they are 
not, what measures should be taken by the State, companies, 
and other actors, including NGOs and citizens, to redress 
imbalances where they persist?
These imaginaries of information societies matter because 
the present bias is toward the dominant model favouring 
market-led developments and focusing on information 
exchange, information scarcity secured through copyright, and 
rapid technological innovation and mastery. This contrasts with 
alternative models which favour a widening of the information 
commons to foster information sharing, information abundance, 
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and generative innovation from the bottom up.  The challenge 
for policy and practice is how to achieve a better balance 
between these contending approaches.
The contests between the two models will persist and 
continue to challenge policy makers and practitioners for two 
major reasons. These are related to two key paradoxes which 
are present in all of today’s information societies regardless 
of their position in the rankings for broadband, Internet and 
mobile penetration or access to information.  
The first is the ‘paradox of information’: information is costly 
to produce and intellectual property rights create incentives for 
creativity, diversity and growth; and, information is virtually 
costless to reproduce and incentives are created for creativity, 
diversity and growth when it is feely distributed. The second is 
the ‘paradox of complexity’: the intrinsic benefits of complexity 
(mainly non-transparent automation of information processing) 
in the digital system are leading to decreasing control through 
traditional means of governance; and, the intrinsic benefits of 
complexity in the digital system are leading to enhanced control 
and new modes of governance within a decentralized network 
system.
The result of these paradoxes is that there are frictions and 
resistance among oppositional groups whose principal interests 
lie mainly with one or the other features of these paradoxes. 
With respect to the information paradox, there are many new 
ways to legitimize the open circulation of information and so 
contestations in this area, though likely to persist, may become 
less trenchant as policy makers and the private sector introduce 
new hybrid approaches that balance interests in open and 
closed information environments. In the case of the second 
paradox, however, strong advocacy for market-led development 
of information societies without regulation because of the 
perceived risks of intervening in a complex technological 
system with uncertain outcomes is likely to persist. It will be 
accompanied by strong advocacy for policy, which promotes 
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transparency and accountability of State and private companies 
in order to ensure that human rights to privacy are protected 
and expectations for citizen safety and security are met. 
Regardless of which imaginary of information societies is 
privileged, measures that accommodate conflicting interests 
are unlikely to be effective when the main focus of policy is on 
technology, e.g. ICT hardware, software, networks and services, 
instead of on human relationships within information societies. 
Technologies are not proxies for the knowledge people draw 
upon in order to make sense of their world. They are not proxies 
for ‘how things go on between them and their fellows’. In the 
face of paradoxes such as these that infuse information societies 
with contradictions and conflict among stakeholders, the best 
way forward is to consider the interlinked policy corrections 
that are needed to counter monopolies of knowledge wherever 
they appear. 
For example, the claim that there is a universal information 
society is one such monopolistic argument. Countering this 
‘imaginary’ means addressing how best to foster multiple 
approaches within and outside the commercial marketplace.  It 
requires initiatives to roll back expansionist intellectual property 
legislation, giving attention to the specific needs, resources and 
strengths of particular markets and collaborative cultures in the 
different countries and regions. It also requires deliberation 
on the appropriate limits of intrusive online surveillance and 
privacy invasions, consistent with human rights and freedom 
of expression and acknowledge that the complexity of today’s 
digital networks and applications means that the surveillance 
(State and corporate) which is possible today may become more 
excessive in the future, if it is not governed effectively.  
Policy corrections are needed to effectively institutionalize 
procedures for holding states and companies accountable 
through legislation, policy and regulation, and for holding 
dispersed online communities accountable as well.   In 
practice, this means that policy for information societies needs 
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to shift from the present situation in which the majority of 
interventions are top down and strongly driven by technological 
innovation, towards policy that gives greater emphasis to 
bottom–up accountable interventions that are responsive to 
local circumstances. To take just one example, the enthusiasm 
for ‘big data’ and crowdsourcing is being driven by top down 
policy in the name of acquiring new information resources 
that are scientifically validated and curated, consistent with 
the dominant imaginary which seeks to maintain, preserve and 
add value to digital research data throughout its life cycle, the 
goal being the accumulation of knowledge for formal science 
and technological innovation.  In contrast, there are increasing 
examples of ‘big data’ leading to knowledge that is useful for 
local actors which rely on voluntary contributions of distributed 
groups using open methods for validated information that 
can be applied in social problem solving. This alternative is 
supported by an imaginary, which values informal norms for 
openly sharing information with the goal of generating useful 
knowledge for immediate application to social problems.
In conclusion, in the light of the paradoxes of information 
and complexity in today’s information societies, a key issue 
is whether the future is likely to bring continuing and deeper 
conflicts among stakeholders with different interests or 
whether there is potential for temporary reconciliation of the 
goals of market led economic growth and open development 
in future information societies. The hope for reconciliation 
rests on the capacity of all stakeholders to reject the hegemonic 
universal vision of the information society while also resisting 
reactionary forms of bottom up localism that ignores the larger 
contact of power relations in society. Policies and strategies 
for future information societies must devise accountability 
measures that avoid the excesses of governance from above (top 
down interventions and exclusively market led development) 
and the excesses of naïve trust in commons-led developments 
(bottom up initiatives and exclusively open developments). The 
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outcomes, which will take different shapes in various countries 
and regions, will be determined by the balance which is struck 
between open, closed and hybrid imaginaries, policies and 
practices in future information societies.
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